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ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PATENT MARKET: A 
DUTY TO MONITOR PATENT RISK FROM THE 
BOARDROOM 
Ian David McClure† 
Patent risk is on the rise; and not just because there is more patent 
litigation now than ever before. The value of strategic patent 
management is no longer an unknown or ignored ingredient to 
corporate success. Nor is proactive and pragmatic patent risk 
assessment. Shareholders and investors have now caught on that patent 
management and patent risk affect the value of their equity. This 
realization has initiated a circuitous life cycle in which more patents 
are being transacted, divested and strategically managed, resulting in 
more patent risk for operating companies to monitor. Yet, this last 
piece—the proactive monitoring of patent risk—may have serious 
consequences to many companies if wrong decisions are made. For 
example, because over 96% of companies in the United States make 
less than $10 million in annual revenues, a patent litigation costing the 
average $2.5 million could be a “bet the company” event. Therefore, 
when so much shareholder value is at stake, there is a very reasonable 
policy argument that the level of accountability should meet the level 
of the risk. After all, corporate boards of directors are accountable for 
guarding shareholder value. As this article will demonstrate, they 
may—and perhaps should—have a fiduciary duty to those shareholders 
to monitor excessive patent risk taking by the company. The health of 
innovation and our knowledge economy may depend on it. 
† Ian D. McClure is an experienced corporate, M&A and intellectual property 
transactions attorney and licensing business development professional. He is a member of the 
“IAM Strategy 300 – The World’s Leading IP Strategists” (IAM Magazine). B.A. in Economics 
from Vanderbilt University (cum laude), J.D. from Chapman University’s Fowler School of Law 
(magna cum laude), and L.L.M. from DePaul University College of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The value of intangible assets, of which intellectual property is a 
component, relative to other corporate assets has ballooned from 20% 
to 80% of corporate value since 1975.1 Supporting the proximate 
accuracy of this measurement is the incredible increase in patent filings 
over the same period.2 Specifically, four times the number of patent 
1. Ocean Tomo Announces Results of Annual Study of Intangible Asset Market Value, 
OCEAN TOMO MEDIA ROOM (June 15, 2010), http://www.oceantomo.com/media/newsreleases 
/Intangible-Asset-Market-Value-Study-Release. As Ocean Tomo’s Chairman James E. 
Malackowski explained: 
Within the last quarter century, the market value of the S&P 500 companies has 
deviated greatly from their book value. This “value gap” indicates that physical 
and financial accountable assets reflected on a company’s balance sheet comprises 
less than 20% of the true value of the average firm. . . . Our further research shows 
that a significant portion of this intangible value is represented by patented 
technology. 
Id. 
2. See Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart 1963–2013, USPTO,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2015, 12:21 
AM). Utility patent applications actually decreased year-on-year in 1977, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1991, 
1996, 2008, and 2009, but continued their upward trajectory nonetheless. Id.; see also Robert 
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applications were filed in 2012 than in 1975.3 This has resulted in an 
increased focus on IP protection and enforcement, as is evidenced by 
the steady rise in patent litigation since 1990,4 capped by an 
unprecedented 30% increase in patent litigation filings in 2012 to reach 
5,000 patent suits filed in a year for the first time in history.5  
As the number of patent assertions rises, an operating company’s 
ignorance or excessive risk-taking relative to problematic patents 
owned by other entities—regardless of those entities’ operational 
endeavors—increases the probability of suit.6 An emphasis on strategic 
patent management as an independent business operation has created a 
sophisticated-patent intermediary and services market over the past 10 
years, spurring an influx of patent service firms and software tools 
which make patent search and freedom to operate analysis quite 
manageable in many markets.7 Nevertheless, the practice of ignoring 
patents is driven in part by traditional course of dealing relative to the 
current willful infringement legal doctrine, or at least by parties’ 
general adherence to courts’ application of a low standard for actual 
notice. Reasoning that they are mitigating risk, companies often fail to 
search or engage in ex-ante license negotiations before it is too late. 
Moreover, companies often take on risk by making decisions relative 
to known problematic patents in view of who owns the patent and their 
propensity to enforce it. That risk is growing as patents are increasingly 
being asserted or transferred to entities with a greater propensity to 
enforce.8 
Sterne & Trevor Chaplick, Why Directors Must Take Responsibility For Intellectual Property, 
IAM MAG., Feb–Mar. 2005, at 16, 20 (“The role of IP in certain industry sectors was much less 
prominent a decade ago. . . . Today all industry sectors embrace IP.”).  
3. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, supra note 2. 
4. Sterne & Chaplick, supra note 2, at 20. 
5. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 6 (2013), http:// 
www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf 
[hereinafter PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY]. 
6. See Mark Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19–22 (2008). 
7. Ian McClure & James Malackowski, The Next Big Thing in IP Monetization: A Natural 
Progression to Exchange-Traded Units, LANDSLIDE, May-June 2011, at 32, 32–36 (summary of 
IP intermediary market development); see also Steve Lohr, Patent Auctions Offer Protections to 
Inventors, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/technology 
/21patent.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=patent%20auctions&st=cse (the IP market has experienced “a 
flurry of new companies and investment groups . . . to buy, sell, broker, license and auction 
patents.”). 
8. Patents are being asserted in record-setting number of lawsuits as mentioned in the
PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5. For examples of companies transferring their patents 
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With regard to patent ignorance, despite an assumed heightened 
standard under In re Seagate Technology,9 willful infringement 
findings have not significantly waned,10 and the risk of treble 
damages11 causes companies to turn a blind eye to troublesome 
patents.12 As a result, notwithstanding the merits of any particular case, 
licensing efforts frequently fail to reach a negotiation or even an 
introduction. This circumstance becomes anticipated by patent holders, 
often resorting to litigation first to avoid wasted time or ensure choice 
of venue. An increasingly common practice is to file a complaint first 
and send a copy of the complaint without notice of service to the 
alleged infringer, forcing a time sensitive decision.13 Because the 
allotted time is often not enough time to complete proper diligence and 
financial risk analysis, and because the patentee cannot back off of their 
initial position and let the complaint lapse, litigation is commenced. 
for enforcement purposes, see John Lemus & Emil Temnyalov, Outsourcing Patent Enforcement: 
The Effect of “Patent Privateers” on Litigation and R&D Investments 2–3 (2014), available at 
http://bit.ly/1DikE2g (discussing examples that include Nokia and Sony selling parts of their 
portfolios to MobieMedia, a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) that then sued Apple, HTC and 
Research in Motion (citing Susan Decker, Patent Privateers Sail the Legal Waters Against Apple, 
Google, Bloomberg (Jan. 10, 2013)); Micron sold at least 20% of its patent portfolio between 
2009 and 2013 to Round Rock, a PAE who asserted these patents against SanDisk (citing Ashby 
Jones, Patent ‘Troll’ Tactics Spread, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2012)); suits not limited to the high-
tech industry, as Nike in 2006 sold part of its patent portfolio to Cushion Technologies, LLC who 
later sued several of Nike’s rivals in the athletic shoe business).  
9. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
10. Christopher Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In Re 
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 464–70 (2012) (Seaman’s empirical study 
found that willful infringement has been found in only about 10% fewer cases after Seagate). 
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed.”). 
12. Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 286 (2012) 
(“Successful searching carries a penalty—the risk of treble damages. As a result, many companies 
do not even try to identify the patents that their products may tread upon, remaining ignorant of 
the risks they run until it is too late.”). 
13. See Michael Curley, Radical Reform for Patent Demand Letters, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY MAG., May 2014, 15, 15–16, available at http://bit.ly/1vFh4i0 (“The incentive here 
would be for the enforcing party to file suit and then conduct licensing negotiations on the 
phone . . . a safer path than writing a demand letter, which both gives the accused infringer 
advanced notice . . . and risks drawing the ire of the FTC”); see also Gene Quinn, Motorola Sues 
Apple for Patent Infringement Using Sparse Complaint, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 8, 2010), http:// 
www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/10/08/motorola-sues-apple-for-patent-infringement-with-sparse-co 
mplaint/id=12763/ (detailing the prevalent use of sparse complaints used to simply file a case, 
perhaps without merit, in order to force settlement). 
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Although patent infringement is already a strict liability offense,14 
raising up a duty to identify and manage patent risk may be in the 
interest of the corporations performing competitive analysis by helping 
to avoid suit and accelerate innovation. This benefits diversified 
shareholders and society. Moreover, the commercial practice of some 
companies related to patent “knowledge,” in anticipation of their use 
and import in future patent litigation, is counterintuitive to the mission 
of the patent system to disseminate patent information. Patent search 
and assessing patent risk is increasingly practicable, and intentional 
ignorance of—or excessive risk-taking relative to—problematic 
patents should be subject to stricter scrutiny and oversight. 
Accountability for the knowledge and litigation risk identified 
above should match the level of that risk. Patent infringement damages 
awards continue to break records, and 2012 was again a benchmark 
year with multiple billion-dollar awards.15 Moreover, the risk does not 
reside only in losing. As the demand for competent patent attorneys to 
pursue or defend these actions has ascended, the fixed costs of patent 
litigation remains high.16 These typically unplanned expenses and 
potential liabilities do in fact move the needle for shareholders17 and 
can result in company downfall or, more frequently, restricted patent 
filings to account for the cost.18 All of these effects reduce shareholder 
value. As a result, there is a reasonable argument that the responsibility 
14. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368 (stating that patent infringement is a strict liability offense).
15. PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5. 
16. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, 2013 REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY (2013). 
17. See SANGJUN NAM & CHANGI NAM, THE IMPACT OF PATENT LITIGATION ON
SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN THE IT INDUSTRY 3 (2012), available at http://EconPapers.repec.org 
/RePEc:zbw:itsb12:72514 (summarizing findings from multiple studies that: (a) the wealth effect 
of patent litigation is negative for defendant firms and insignificant for plaintiff firms; (b) the 
wealth effect of patent litigation on biotechnology firms has a negative effect on stock prices; and 
(c) the wealth effect of patent litigation for US public firms was also negative on defendant firms 
from 1984 to 1999, after controlling certain factors pertaining to characteristics). 
18. See Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact On American Innovation and Jobs, and
Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, & the 
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 11 (2013); see also Diomed Patent 
Defendant Files for Chapter 11, Posted in Mass High Tech Blog, BOS. BUS. J. (Jan. 22, 2008, 2:40 
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass-high-tech/2008/01/diomed-patent-defendant 
-files-for-chapter-11.html; see also Ameet Sachdev, Football Gear Maker Files for Bankruptcy 
After Losing Patent-Infringement Suit, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2010), http://articles.chicago 
tribune.com/2010-09-14/business/ct-biz-0914-chicago-law-20100914_1_schutt-sports-riddell-
patent.  
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for monitoring this risk should go to the level responsible for guarding 
shareholder value: the board of directors.  
The current literature comments on a fiduciary duty to monitor 
and to manage risk in many contexts, including illegal employee action 
and excessive risk taking in financial services.19 This literature does not 
explore a duty to manage patent risk. This article will discuss such a 
duty and ultimately conclude that a director fiduciary duty to monitor 
patent risk likely exists—and should.  
First, this article sets the stage by explaining that developments in 
the patent transaction market over the past decade have increased the 
value, and the risk, that patents present to operating companies. Next, 
the article visits the development and prospect for enforcement of a 
duty to monitor under a line of Delaware cases and other academic 
comment on a duty to manage risk. The discussion focuses on the 
highest level of corporate accountability to demonstrate that the door is 
appropriately ajar for this duty to be recognized. In identifying support 
for such a duty, this article distinguishes risk in the patent context from 
strictly financial risk. After defining the duty, the article demonstrates 
that it is unlikely that the boards of most corporations in the U.S. satisfy 
their duty. Next, this article shows that the accountability at this highest 
level must necessarily start with—and should be satisfied by—the 
provision for adequate information reporting lines leading to decisions 
which are subject to adequate oversight. Finally, this article will 
identify policy reasons why this accountability should benefit 
shareholders, members of society, and participants in a troubled patent 
market.  
I. INCREASED STRATEGY AND RISK IN THE PATENT MARKET 
A. Evidence of Increased Patent Strategy 
For many companies worldwide, IP strategy has become 
paramount. Receiving new mandates to generate revenue from IP, 
companies are increasingly selling patents20 or structuring privateering 
19. See Hill & McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties After the Financial
Crisis, 3 ILL. L. REV. 859 (2013).  
20. In January 2012, wireless firm Adaptix sold more than 200 patents to patent licensing 
firm Acacia. See Ben Dummett, Acacia to Acquire Adaptix for $160 Million, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
12, 2012, available at http://on.wsj.com/1FzUtnr. In July 2012, Fujifilm sold 1,200 patents to 
patent licensing and technology firm, Universal Display. See FUJIFILM Corporation Sells Its 
Worldwide OLED Patent Portfolio to Universal Display Corporation for US $105 Million, 
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deals to generate revenues from these assets.21 Deals that transfer 
patents to independent third parties in return for participation in 
licensing and litigation proceeds continue to remain popular through 
2013, transforming patents into a lucrative article of trade.22  
A well-publicized example, of both the increased recognition of 
the strategic value intellectual property and the increased dependency 
on patents to compete, is the recent sale of the bankrupt Nortel 
Networks Corporation’s patent portfolio. After most of Nortel’s other 
assets were sold to various companies for an approximate aggregate 
value of $3 billion, Nortel’s patent portfolio presumably protecting 
these assets and businesses was sold through auction for $4.5 billion to 
a non-practicing entity called Rockstar Consortium, owned by a group 
of operating entities.23 This auction demonstrates the old guard and the 
new guard with respect to patent strategy. Representing the old guard 
through Nortel’s role, the event highlights what companies have 
traditionally neglected to recognize, namely, the value of patent assets 
attributable to shareholder value. Representing the new guard, it 
demonstrates through the role of the winning bidders and the Rockstar 
executives that helped engineer the transaction, the increased emphasis 
on the value of patent assets, namely, the significance of high-stakes 
patent weaponry to competition. Specifically, the winning bid came 
from a consortium of companies, all aligned by the same competitive 
FUJIFILM (July 24, 2012), http://www.fujifilm.com/news/n120724.html. On December 16, 
2013, Panasonic solid 900 patents to patent licensing firm Wi-Lan, and on January 6th it sold 500 
additional patents to patent licensing firm Inventergy. See Joff Wild, Panasonic Makes A Major 
Privateering Play As Japanese Companies Seek To Sweat Their Patents, IAM BLOG (Jan. 10, 
2014), http://www.iam-magazine.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=9375cbd5-7354-41fe-bd18-32a5d392 
bfde. AT&T has a public website for patent sales. See Patent Sales, AT&T, http:// 
www.att.com/gen/sites/ipsales?pid=17701 (last visited June 7, 2014). These represent a fraction 
of the number of such deals consummated over the past 5 years. 
21. Ashby Jones, The Amazing Adventures of Mr. Desmarais and Mr. Powers, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (Jan. 23, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/01/23/the-amazing-adventures-of-mr 
-desmarais-and-mr-powers/; see also Susan Decker, Patent Privateers Sail the Legal Waters 
Against Apple and Google, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/2013-01-11/patent-privateers-sail-the-legal-waters-against-apple-google.html (noting Nokia has 
transferred its patents to privateers for licensing income more than 20-times since 2008); see also 
Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 
4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 2 (2011) (“. . . operating companies have increasingly explored 
indirect uses of IPRs, from buying patents and then asserting them against competitors to buying 
patents solely for the purpose of filing a countersuit in an infringement litigation initiated by a 
competitor.”). 
22. Id. 
23. See Nortel, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nortel (last visited Dec. 5, 2013). 
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interest—to keep the patents out of the hands of Google.24 Therefore, 
the patents had significant defensive value. Some of the patents have 
since been asserted, highlighting their offensive value as well.25 In 
November 2013, Rockstar sued Google, Asustek, HTC, Huawei, LG 
Electronics, Pantech, Samsung, and ZTE for infringement of seven of 
the Nortel patents purchased.26 
Another example of a strategic privateering transaction is Nokia’s 
sale of patents to a small public company, Vringo, Inc., which has 
attempted to commercialize its own technology but can attribute nearly 
all of its value to patent monetization. In August 2012, Nokia sold 124 
patent families to Vringo for $22 million.27 The 124 patent families 
comprise over 500 patents and applications including 110 issued 
patents in the US, and over 45 patents families have at least one patent 
in force in various European jurisdictions.28 At the time, Vringo was 
suing Google for infringement of Vringo’s other patents. Its litigation 
team included Donald Stout, the co-founder of NTP, which in 2006 
received a $612.5 million patent infringement settlement from 
Research In Motion Ltd., the maker of the BlackBerry, and David 
Cohen, the former senior litigation counsel at Nokia.29 The deal with 
Nokia provided Vringo with additional leverage, as well as a channel 
for Nokia to outsource and participate in the proceeds of Vringo’s 
future enforcement of Nokia’s patents. Vringo’s enforcement of 
Nokia’s patents has already begun, as Vringo has filed numerous 
lawsuits against ZTE with the Nokia patents.30 The deal gives Nokia a 
35% share in all licensing income received once Vringo has recouped 
 24. Joff Wild, Google Bid $4 Billion for the Nortel Patents and Still Lost, IAM BLOG 
(July 2, 2011), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=1d7387a7-70fc-4e12-807b-e5 
68c19f63e1.  
 25. See Rockstar Files Lawsuit Against Google and Smartphone Makers, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.worldipreview.com/news/rock 
star-files-lawsuit-against-google-and-smartphone-makers. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Nokia to Sell 500 Patents to Licensing Firm Vringo, YAHOO! FINANCE (Aug. 9, 
2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/nokia-sell-500-patents-licensing-193248944.html.  
 28. See Vringo, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vringo (last visited June 7, 
2014).  
 29. Rockstar Files Lawsuit Against Google and Smartphone Makers, supra note 25.  
 30. Vringo has filed lawsuits against ZTE in the UK and France. See Vringo Files Lawsuit 
Against ZTE, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201210 
08005706/en/Vringo-Files-Lawsuit-ZTE#U5OCNU1OW00; see also Vringo Expands Patent 
Suits Against ZTE, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/vringo 
-expands-patent-suits-against-zte-2013-04-01.  
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the initial purchase price.31 Patent office assignment records also show 
that Alcatel-Lucent has since transferred assets to Vringo, presumably 
to take advantage of the same strategic “hands-off” monetization 
approach that Nokia is benefiting from.32 
B. Evidence of Increased Patent Risk 
Patent market transactions that transfer assets to non-practicing 
entities, such as the ones highlighted above, have played a large part in 
the continuous rise in patent litigation since 1990.33 Quite simply, an 
increased focus by operating entities on the strategic value and revenue 
generation of patents, coupled with a market influx of patent assertion 
entities (PAE)34 playing the role of speculators, has led to increased 
proactive management and assertion of patents.35 As was already 
 31. Mark Summerfield, Courts Play Host to NPE Global Licensing Strategies, IAM BLOG 
(Nov. 13. 2013), http://www.iam-magazine.com/reports/detail.aspx?g=52eeb6d7-78e9-4f8e-9e 
2a-e077e1ae42f4.  
 32. Joff Wild, Alcatel Agrees Privateering Hook-Up With Vringo; Expect More Such Deals 
to Follow, IAM BLOG (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=ad 
a129d1-6957-46ed-8bf4-3c068cb5690d. 
 33. Sterne and Chaplick, supra note 2, at 20; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 26 (2013), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf (“About 12 percent of PMEs sued 10 
defendants or more in a single lawsuit, compared to about 3 percent of operating companies, a 
statistically significant difference. Thus, even with bringing about a fifth of all patent infringement 
lawsuits from 2007 to 2011, PMEs sued close to one-third of the overall defendants, accounting 
for about half of the overall increase in defendants. Additionally, the estimated total number of 
defendants sued by PMEs more than tripled from 834 in 2007 to 3,401 in 2011.”). Rockstar, the 
entity that purchased the Nortel patent assets, has since filed multiple litigations asserting 
infringement of these patents. See Rockstar Files Lawsuit Against Google and Smartphone 
Makers, supra note 25. Vringo has filed patent litigation involving the assets it purchased from 
Nokia. See Vringo Files Lawsuit Against ZTE, supra note 30. 
 34. An attempt to define an NPE is an entirely different matter outside the bounds and 
purpose of this article. It has been the subject of much academic, industry and legislative comment 
over previous years, highlighted by the recent introduction of the Saving High-Tech Innovators 
from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act bill. See H.R. 845, 113th Congress (2013–2014), 
available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/845 For a taste of the many 
perspectives and problematic policy issues in defining an patent assertion entity, non-practicing 
entity, or “patent troll” (this author does not condone use of the “patent troll” term, for reasons 
that should be obvious by reviewing these perspectives), see Is RPX an NPE?, RPX BLOG (Nov. 
2, 2010), http://www.rpxcorp.com/2010/11/02/is-rpx-an-npe/; see also What is an NPE?, 
PATENTFREEDOM.COM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/background/ (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2015); see also Brian Hannon & Margaret Welsh, Challenges of Defining a Patent Troll, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (July 29, 2014), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions 
/challenges-of-defining-a-patent-troll/.  
 35. Rockstar Files Lawsuit Against Google and Smartphone Makers, supra note 25. 
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highlighted herein, patent litigation filings increased by a record 
breaking 30% in 2012 to reach over 5,000 patent suits filed in a year 
for the first time in history.36 While it is important to point out that the 
2012 surge was partly a direct result of companies’ attempt to beat the 
implementation of the America Invents Act in that same year, patent 
litigation filings increased by 11.2% from 5,778 in 2012 to 6,427 filings 
in 2013, demonstrating that patent infringement lawsuits are indeed on 
the rise.37 Contrary to the belief of many, PAE’s are not the sole cause 
of the increase in patent litigation. Operating entities have also 
accounted for increased filings, undoubtedly driven by the focus on 
patent strategy and the opportunity to win big or collapse a 
competitor.38 Additionally, PAE’s generally would not be able to 
litigate patents but for the sale of those patents to them by operating 
entities. More than 80% of patents litigated by PAE’s are from 
operating entities, and more than 1,000 companies have transferred 
patents to PAE’s.39  
Without regard to the risky outcome of patent litigation, the 
average fixed costs are extraordinarily high for any company. On 
average, when between $1 million and $25 million is at risk, patent 
litigation costs reach $2.5 million, and when more than $25 million is 
at risk these costs reach $5 million.40 Yet, the increased possibility of 
patent litigation being filed and the standard cost required to play is not 
the totality of the risk. Patent infringement damages awards continue 
to break records. According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers 2013 Patent 
Litigation Study,41 “[p]rior to 2012, only three patent infringement 
 36. PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5.  
 37. PatStats, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW CENTER, http://www.patstats.org/Pat 
stats3.html (last updated Apr. 25, 2014) (“For 2013 Eastern Texas was highest, with 1513 filings 
in 2013 (versus 1266 cases in 2012), now 23.5% of the national total. Second was Delaware, with 
1336 filings (up from 997 in 2012), now 20.8% of the national total. Central California was again 
a distant third, dropping from 517 cases in 2012 to 486 in 2013.”).  
 38. PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5. 
 39. The Patent Assertion Problem, THE LICENSE ON TRANSFER (LOT) NETWORK, 
http://www.lotnet.com/patent-assertion-problem/index.cfm (last visited July 19, 2014).  
 40. 2013 REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 16; see also Linda Chiem, High-
Stakes IP Work Continues Its Steady Climb, GCs Say, LAW360, http://www.law360.com/articles 
/470061/high-stakes-ip-work-continues-its-steady-climb-gcs-say (last updated Sept. 9, 2013 1:52 
PM ET) (“In 2010 IP litigation was a $2.4 billion legal market. It climbed to $2.8 billion in 2012, 
to $2.9 billion in 2013 and is projected to reach $3 billion in 2014”). 
 41. PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5, at 2 (noting also that “[t]he outcomes of 
these matters have varied so far. Monsanto v. DuPont settled for a ten-year $1.75 billion license; 
the $1.05 billion award in Apple v. Samsung was reduced by $450 million and likely will be 
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damages awards eclipsed the $1 billion mark. But last year alone, three 
cases, tried before juries in separate districts, resulted in awards of $1 
billion or greater: Monsanto v. DuPont,42 Apple v. Samsung,43 and 
Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell.”44 In two of these cases, 
DuPont and Marvell, shareholders have filed ongoing derivative 
lawsuits against the company, board and its executives for, among 
other claims, breaches of fiduciary duties related to mishandling patent 
infringement, the patent infringement lawsuit and, put simply, patent 
risk.45  
The median damages award was approximately $4.9 million 
between 2007 and 2012. While the median jury award was many times 
greater than the median bench award, one empirical study has found 
that during this same period courts awarded enhanced damages more 
often than juries when finding willful infringement. The enhanced 
damages awarded by courts during this time have been, on average, 
greater than juries.46  
In sum, patent owners are increasingly managing and divesting 
assets that, at one time, may not have been utilized in the same way. As 
a result, the value of such assets has increased to their holders, and the 
risk that such assets present to operating entities has increased. The 
growing focus on patent monetization and resulting litigation raises a 
new bar for accountability with respect to risk taking relative to 
patents—or put more simply, infringement.  
modified further; and Carnegie Mellon v. Marvell remains in the post-trial phase and continues in 
this phase as of June 7, 2014.”). 
 42. Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 09-cv-686, U.S. District Court, 
Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis Aug. 1, 2012)  
 43. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 44. Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 2d 637 
(W.D. Pa. 2012). 
 45. See Voss v. Sutardja, case No. 5:14-cv-01581 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 6, 2014); see also 
Zomolosky v. Kullman, case No. 1:13-cv-00094 (D. Del. filed Jan. 16, 2013). These cases are 
ongoing and, while the purpose of this article is not to address these cases individually, their 
claims are very relevant to the concepts explored here and their outcomes could invoke a follow-
up comment to this article. 
 46. Christopher Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In Re 
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 464–70 (2012). But the study also found that 
courts have found willful infringement in a meaningfully less percentage of cases than juries have 
since Seagate, whereas this comparison was close to equal before. See id. at 444–49. 
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II. A DUTY TO MONITOR EXCESSIVE PATENT RISK-TAKING 
A. Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Risk 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, many people, including 
investors, academics, and politicians called for greater oversight of 
corporate risk-taking.47 Two well known corporate governance authors, 
Claire Hill and Brett McDonnell, pinned this oversight at the top: 
“Boards should be charged with monitoring for risks arising from 
corporations’ operations and procedures . . . that might significantly 
harm both shareholders and society at large.”48 Yet, properly 
identifying, defining and successfully alleging breach of this duty “has 
famously been characterized as one of the hardest for shareholders to 
win.”49 Indeed, shareholder suits following the financial crisis—an 
event demonstrating a seemingly obvious failure of accountability for 
risk—failed. Yet, there is good reason—and court precedent—
supporting existence of a duty to monitor risk, or the “oversight duty,” 
and existence of a duty presumes some circumstance for breach.50 The 
lineage of court opinions that create, categorize, and limit this duty tell 
us a lot about its potential application and enforcement related to patent 
risk. Specifically, a director fiduciary duty to monitor a corporation’s 
patent risk likely exists, and for good reason. 
1. Review of Fiduciary Duties 
As corporate fiduciaries, the members of the board of directors 
have obligations to the corporation that are guided by a duty of care 
and a duty of loyalty.51 Under the duty of care, the board owes a duty 
 47. ERIC J. PAN, DUTY TO MONITOR UNDER DELAWARE LAW: FROM CAREMARK TO 
CITIGROUP, THE CONFERENCE BOARD 1–2 (2010) (“The absence of adequate board oversight is 
partially to blame for the catastrophic losses suffered by Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, 
and Citigroup . . . if they had [provided oversight], perhaps the catastrophic losses suffered by 
these firms could have been prevented.”); see also CHRISTINE HURT, THE DUTY TO MANAGE 
RISK, ILLINOIS PROGRAM IN LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 2–4 (2013). 
 48. See Hill & McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties After the Financial 
Crisis, supra note 19. 
 49. Id.  
 50. PAN, supra note 47, at 3 (“The duty to monitor is an obligation to prevent harm to the 
corporation. The board may breach its duty when harm occurs due to its inattention or inaction.”); 
see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 51. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (“[a]lthough good faith may be described colloquially as 
part of a “triad” of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to 
act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing 
. . . Only the latter two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability.”). 
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to exercise good business judgment and to use ordinary care and 
prudence in the operation of the business.52 Although there is no 
statutory codification of the duty of care in the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, Delaware courts have shaped the duty through a web 
of opinions. It is included in the Model Business Corporation Act 
sections 8.30 and 8.31, which was largely adopted by many states.53  
Importantly for the purposes of this article, one tenet of the duty 
of care was shaped by the Smith v. Van Gorkom decision in 1985, 
namely, that board decisions must be adequately informed.54 Van 
Gorkom is also famously recognized as one of the only successful 
shareholder claims of director liability for breach of the duty of care, 
as legislators and courts have sought to limit this director liability as a 
result of the outcome.55 Van Gorkom involved a proposed leveraged 
buy-out merger of TransUnion by Marmon Group.56 TransUnion’s 
chairman and CEO chose a proposed price for the deal without 
consultation with outside financial experts.57 The proposed merger was 
subject to board approval, and at the board meeting numerous 
important pieces of information were never raised or considered.58 The 
court stated that the rule “is a presumption that in making a business 
decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.”59 Thus, the decision was not protected by 
the rule because it was not well informed, and the court found that the 
directors breached their duty of care to the corporation.  
In addition to being the seminal case for requiring informed 
decisions by the board, the Van Gorkom decision is also important for 
prompting the codification of Delaware General Corporation Law 
§ 102(b)(7), which permits Delaware companies (with shareholder 
 52. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 53. See State Corporation Laws, U.S. LEGAL, http://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of 
-corporations/state-corporation-laws/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (The majority of states have 
adopted the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) as the basis of their own state laws, though 
each of these states has modified the provisions of the MBCA.). 
 54. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. 
 55. Gordon Moodie, Forty Years of Charter Competition: A Race to Protect Directors from 
Liability?, Harv. L. School., 37–40, (Sept. 2004), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs 
/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Moodie_1.pdf 
 56. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 863.  
 57. Id. at 866–68, 878. 
 58. Id. at 865, 877. 
 59. Id. at 872. 
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approval) to adopt charter amendments that exculpate directors from 
personal liability for breaches of the duty of care.60 Such a charter 
amendment was adopted by a large majority of Delaware 
corporations.61 Successfully proving a breach of the duty of care 
already means overcoming the business judgment rule, which lends to 
directors a presumption that they have exercised due care.62 Therefore, 
without the § 102(b)(7) exculpation provision, the duty of care is 
already the most difficult path for a shareholder plaintiff to prove 
director liability.63 With it, at least for shareholders of Delaware 
corporations, a claim for breach of the duty of care typically gets tossed 
on a motion to dismiss and, therefore, is generally avoided altogether.64 
However, § 102(b)(7) only exculpates directors from the duty of care, 
and the business judgment rule is invoked only when the board has 
made a decision.65 As a result, without expressly alleging a breach of a 
duty of care or loyalty, if a claim involves activities of the corporation 
that were not subject to a director decision, then the court will generally 
review it as an oversight claim under the duty of loyalty.66 This is 
important for the purposes of this article because the combination of 
 60. See 8 Del. Code Ann. § 102(b)(7) (2014). 
 61. Moodie, supra note 55, at 39–40; see also Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for 
Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 914 (1990).  
 62. In Delaware, “courts routinely dismiss complains pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) based on 
the business judgment rule.” NCS Healthcare, Inc. v. Candlewood Partners, LLC, 827 N.E.2d 
797, 803 n.3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, 835 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio 2005). The presumption 
of the business judgment rule attaches ab initio. See Shant Chalian & Kristen Bandura, The 
Business Judgement Rule and the Entire Fairness Doctrine, ROBSINON & COLE, LLP, http:// 
www.rc.com/documents/Primer%20on%20Business%20Judgment%20Rule.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2015). 
 63. See HURT, supra note 47, at 19 (“[t]he legal avenue with the least probability of success 
for imposing liability on directors and officers at such firms is a lawsuit alleging a breach of the 
duty of care.”). 
 64. In most cases brought since In re Caremark alleging a breach of duty to monitor risk, 
the complaints generally avoid choosing breach of a duty of care or loyalty, at least expressly. See 
In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“The theory 
of relief on which the claim rests is not immediately apparent.”). 
 65. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004) (“The business judgment rule commonly is understood today as a 
standard of liability by which courts review the decision of the board of directors.”). 
 66. See HURT, supra note 47, at n.92 (“If the claim points to activities of the firm that were 
not subject to a director decision, then the court will interpret this as an oversight claim under the 
duty of loyalty.”). 
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the business-judgment rule and the exculpation provisions makes the 
duty of care a losing bet for shareholders.67 
The very limited enforcement of the duty of care is of course a 
nod to the overarching preference that boards be risk-tolerant instead 
of risk-averse. The nearly complete absolving of liability for all director 
decisions that results from the combination of the business judgment 
rule and exculpation provisions, however, may render the need for 
accountability futile. After all, the result demonstrates a deferment to 
the need for risk-taking and may create conditions for excessive risk 
taking.68 The resulting lopsided balance of interests may ignore the idea 
that “accountability can have the healthy effect of deterring the almost-
egregious mistakes and of incentivizing thoughtful decision-making 
processes,”69 and the prospect that this could maximize shareholder 
wealth.70 Nevertheless, Delaware courts have for years accepted that 
shareholders are generally okay with the possibility that directors make 
mistakes.71  
Under the duty of loyalty, board members must execute their 
actions in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation, 
exercising the care an ordinary person would use under similar 
circumstances.72 The duty of loyalty generally arises through a conflict 
of interest created by a director that diverts corporate assets or usurps 
opportunities or information from the corporation for personal gain. 
For the purpose of this article, a categorization of a claim under the 
duty of loyalty is important in light of the above described exculpation 
 67. See Jill A. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 652 (2006) (“The combined effect of the business judgment rule and 
director exculpation provisions is to limit most fiduciary duty claims to breaches of the duty of 
loyalty . . .”). 
 68. See HURT, supra note 47, at n.101 (noting that enforcement of the duty of care reflects 
a balance between honoring the authority of directors while also holding them to some standard 
of accountability, but that “[t]he balance in that equation definitely seems to tip toward 
‘authority’”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. If comparing two assumed diversified shareholder investment portfolios between (1) a 
broad sample set of less risky yet more careful decisions under greater judicial scrutiny and (2) a 
broad sample set of more risky decisions with complete autonomy and deference, there is no 
empirical evidence demonstrating that (2) maximizes shareholder wealth. See Andrew S. Gold, A 
Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, 
and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 404 (2007). 
 71. This is not unlike the generally passive acceptance that the USPTO makes mistakes 
issuing patents. 
 72. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858. 
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clauses and the application of the business judgment rule to director 
decisions. To be clear, without availability of an exculpation clause or 
the business judgment rule, claims for a breach of the duty of loyalty 
in general could have an increased survivability relative to claims for 
breach of the duty of care. This is especially critical because the duty 
of oversight73 established by In re Caremark in 1996 was confirmed to 
categorically fall under the duty of loyalty, and not the duty of care, by 
Stone v. Ritter ten years later.74 As a result, despite the generally 
unsuccessful track record of Caremark claims in practice, it is assumed 
that, because of the nonexistence of an exculpation clause or the 
business judgment rule, these claims should at least have a better 
chance of surviving a motion to dismiss and being heard on their merits. 
This is the effect that the decision in Stone intended: save the duty of 
oversight from extinction and allow its enforcement. This is a special 
recognition of its importance and a potential clue regarding its 
enforcement—a point of emphasis for this article. The categorization 
under a duty of loyalty also has limiting effects on enforcement, 
specifically, liability is conditioned upon proof of scienter or bad faith. 
The balance of these effects is key to a claim’s survivability, and will 
be discussed in the following sections. 
2. In re Caremark 
In 1963, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. became 
the first Delaware decision to recognize the board of directors’ 
responsibility to prevent corporate misconduct.75 Shareholders of the 
corporation sued the board for failing to prevent employees from 
violating federal antitrust law.76 Although the court rejected the claim, 
it acknowledged a fiduciary duty to monitor wrongdoing.77 The duty 
was qualified under three characteristics. First, the duty fell under the 
duty of care as a part of the board’s responsibility to oversee 
 73. The duty of oversight created by the In re Caremark case is also commonly referred to 
as the duty to monitor. See PAN, supra note 47. 
 74. See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); see 
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); see HURT, supra note 47, at 31 (“Though this evolving 
interpretation may seem unexpected, this judicial turn saves the oversight cause of action from 
extinction . . . these cases will continue to be brought and have a chance of surviving a demand 
hearing in the derivative context.”). 
 75. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).  
 76. Id. at 127, 129. 
 77. Id. at 129–30. 
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management action.78 Second, the duty only extended to corporate 
actions that are illegal.79 Third, the duty would only arise if “something 
occurs to put [members of the board] on suspicion that something is 
wrong.”80 In other words, the court felt that directors did not need to 
“install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out 
wrongdoing.”81 
Thirty years later, the Delaware Court of Chancery reconsidered 
the duty to monitor in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative 
Litigation (hereinafter referred to as “Caremark”). Today, despite its 
qualification by later decisions such as Stone v. Ritter, the Caremark 
decision is the most comprehensive exploration of the duty to 
monitor—the oversight duty—and claims for breach of this duty are 
frequently referred to as “Caremark-claims.” 
Caremark International had been the target of a federal 
investigation of payments made by Caremark International employees 
to physicians in exchange for patient referrals. Such payments were 
illegal—a violation of federal healthcare regulations, specifically the 
Anti-Referral Payments Law.82 The board was not aware of the 
violations nor did they directly authorize them.83 Under Delaware 
precedent at the time, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., the board 
would not be responsible for these actions unless there were red flags.84 
However, the presiding Chancellor Allen was compelled to create a 
stronger duty in the absence of red flags “to assure that a corporate 
information and reporting system . . . exists.”85 A limit was also placed 
on this duty, in particular, “only a sustained or systematic failure of the 
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to 
assure a reasonable information and reporting system [exists]—will 
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to 
liability.”86 Nevertheless, a much debated oversight duty, and the road 
that will develop it, had been initiated. 
 78. Id. at 130. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961–62. 
 83. Id. at 971. 
 84. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1963).  
 85. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 86. Id. at 971. 
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3. Stone v. Ritter 
In its 2006 Stone v. Ritter decision, the Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed Caremark.87 Facing “a classic Caremark claim”, the court was 
met with a derivative suit filed by shareholders against the board of 
AmSouth Bancorporation for failure to institute an adequate system for 
monitoring legal compliance with banking law.88 The failures led to 
fines and penalties sanctioned against the bank.89 Nevertheless, the 
court ultimately dismissed the claim because the company had in place 
a comprehensive information reporting system that the board designed 
itself.90 The system failed, but the board had satisfied its monitoring 
duties in good faith. For most commentators, the dismissal was 
apparently not a surprise, nor was the court’s upholding of the 
Caremark standard.91 The court did, however, maneuver the Caremark 
standard into a two-option test for director liability. The court stated: 
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions 
predicate for director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly 
failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls, 
or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously 
failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves 
from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.92 
Two elements of the Stone v. Ritter decision, however, were to the 
surprise of many people and, as will be described in the next section, 
create survivability and a trail for the duty to monitor that has not yet 
been blazed. First, the court held that Caremark was really about the 
directors’ duty to act in good faith, and second, the duty to act in good 
faith is subsumed by the duty of loyalty, not the duty of care as 
Chancellor Allen had believed in Caremark.93 The court explained 
itself: 
 87. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006). 
 88. Id. at 364–365. 
 89. Id. at 365–366. 
 90. Id. at 369. 
 91. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of 
Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1777 (2007) (“The outcome in the case was not 
surprising . . . [and the upholding of the Caremark standard] confirms what most observers 
expected.”). 
 92. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370; see also Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra 
note 91, at 1777. 
 93. Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra note 91, at 1769. 
 
V31_MCCLURE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2015 3:53 PM 
2015]  ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PATENT MARKET 235 
The failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the 
requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a 
condition, “of the fundamental duty of loyalty.” It follows that 
because a showing of bad faith conduct, in the sense described in 
Disney and Caremark, is essential to establish director oversight 
liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of 
loyalty.94 
This is significant as the exculpation clause is not applicable 
(AmSouth had one), and the court must not dismiss the claim if it 
adequately pleads facts that support a Caremark claim. Furthermore, 
the duty of loyalty is no longer just about conflict of interest, but now 
it includes good faith, or rather, bad faith.95  
4. A Duty to Monitor Today and Tomorrow 
According to Hill and McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and its progeny 
of cases creates three new categories under the duty of loyalty: (1) 
“structural bias”, or excessive deference to other directors; (2) cases 
involving self-interest but also core corporate concerns, therefore not 
falling squarely within the traditional duty of loyalty, and (3) conduct 
involving illegality—“a ‘culpable’ lack of diligence to prevent illegal 
acts, such as was alleged in Stone itself and in Caremark, or actual 
commission of illegal acts.”96 It is the third category with which this 
article concerns itself.  
A reasonable argument against inclusion of a duty to monitor 
illegal acts under the duty of loyalty is set forth by Stephen Bainbridge. 
In many cases an illegal act by an executive is simply a miscalculation 
of risk or the associated cost-benefit analysis, and therefore is a 
business decision that should receive deference under the business 
judgment rule.97 However, Hill and McDonnell articulate “several 
reasons why we might want to treat illegal behavior differently, with 
less legal deference.”98 Their reasoning deserves full discovery here: 
 94. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–370. 
 95. Some commentators believe that the Stone v. Ritter decision may leave only one single 
overarching duty—the duty of loyalty. Commenting on the Stone v. Ritter decision, Hill and 
McDonnell applaud the decision and add that “we think the duty of care in total, including both 
Caremark-type care and the more generic inattention-type care, is properly understood as largely 
subsumed by the duty of loyalty.” See Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra note 
91, at 1770. 
 96. Id. at 1780–1784. 
 97. Id. at 1784; See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and 
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559 (2008), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1006097.  
 98. Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra note 91, at 1784. 
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For one, the directors’ willingness to tolerate or engage in illegal 
conduct may be a proxy for their willingness to engage in conduct 
that more directly diverges with the shareholders’ interests. 
Someone who sets out to break the law often displays stealth and a 
willingness to pursue a more parochial interest over a competing 
more general interest: their own personal interest over the interests 
of others . . . or their corporations’ interest over more general social 
welfare . . . Shareholders are also citizens, and insofar as laws 
advance the general social welfare, citizens care about that. A 
diversified shareholder with small stakes in any one corporation 
may well find that the public interest predominates over the 
corporate interest.”99  
Hill and McDonnell confirm separately that “the most intelligible 
construction [of the rationale supporting the board’s duties regarding 
illegal conduct] includes harm to shareholders and harm to society.”100 
After all, some illegal conduct—including patent infringement—might 
certainly benefit shareholders monetarily. In any case, it is certain that 
where a board actively engages in “conduct involving illegality,” to be 
distinguished from neglecting to monitor illegal activity, liability 
results.101 To satisfy its duty, a board must abide by its Caremark 
duties, or rather ensure that it has in good faith put in place an 
information reporting system to monitor any such wrongdoing.  
Many commentators have debated applicability of the duty to 
monitor to find director liability in the wake of the most recent financial 
crisis. The exercise requires the matching of the duty to monitor legal 
compliance with the duty to monitor business or financial risk 
generally.102 The rationale for maintaining the duty in this context—
harm to society—is painfully present as evidenced in the aftermath of 
the crisis. The commentators have taken different sides, however, in 
concluding whether the duty does or should exist in this context. Hill 
and McDonnell find that “the financial crisis helps make the case that 
board monitoring should extend to conduct potentially imposing 
significant harm on shareholders,” despite the admission that “illegality 
was . . . ultimately not that important” a part of the crisis.103 Going 
further, they add that “we would explicitly state that the Caremark 
 99. Id. at 1784–85 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Hill & McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties, supra note 19, at 866. 
 102. See id.; see also HURT, supra note 47.  
 103. Hill & McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties, supra note 19.  
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oversight duty includes a duty to monitor business risk generally, not 
just the risk of breaking the law.”104 Indeed, the court in In re Citigroup, 
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation seemed to suggest the same, 
without so explicitly stating or holding.105  
Christine Hurt, Professor of Law and Director, Program in 
Business Law & Policy at the University of Illinois College of Law, 
concludes that the failure to extend the duty to monitor to business or 
financial risk, and the completely unsuccessful duty to monitor claims 
that arose from the financial crisis, is “a logical and reasoned” 
outcome.106 First, like Hill and McDonnell, Hurt expressly 
distinguishes the duty to monitor financial risk from the duty to monitor 
violations of law or regulations.107 Hurt does categorize the actions 
causing the financial crisis as “excessive risk-taking,” but that which 
was “otherwise legal.”108 Second, Hurt argues that recognizing a duty 
to monitor financial risk would be imprudent because a breach of the 
duty would be identifiable only in hindsight.109 Third, Hurt suggests 
that the duty to manage financial risk would also encompass failures to 
take risks, making risk-averse firms also susceptible to breach of duty 
claims.110 Next, Hurt argues that a Caremark claim may only be 
successful if a board does not have a reporting or risk-management 
system in place. Hurt writes, “[a] modern U.S. publicly-held 
corporation that faces any type of financial risk will almost certainly 
have a system in place.” Further, Hurt proposes that decisions by their 
risk committees regarding the levels of risk that are present should be 
protected because, presumably, only hindsight can determine if the 
levels were excessive.111 Finally, Hurt notes that a duty to manage 
financial risk implies that a court is able to determine the optimal 
amount of risk, or at least what is too much or too little risk, and this 
 104. Id. at 873.  
 105. In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 106. See HURT, supra note 47, at 7, 45 (“[N]ot only does a duty to manage financial risk not 
exist within the prevailing corporate law framework of fiduciary duties, but [] . . . recognizing a 
separate duty to manage financial risk would be imprudent.”). 
 107. Id. at 4 (“Most of the behavior at the heart of the financial crisis was not obviously 
intentional violations of criminal laws or other regulations, but risky trading practices involving 
mortgage-related derivatives.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 7–8. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 39–40. 
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would be impossible for financial risks. The next section will attempt 
to show that these arguments do not translate to the patent risk context. 
B. Fiduciary Duties and Patent Risk 
Board fiduciary duties related to intellectual property have 
surprisingly been the subject of very little academic comment. To the 
author’s knowledge, there has been no academic comment on board 
fiduciary duties related to the management of patent infringement risk. 
Robert Sterne and Trevor Chaplick likewise acknowledged that it is “a 
topic that has received surprisingly little attention.”112 Nevertheless, as 
the recognition of patent asset value increases, and as patent 
infringement filings rise in tandem with the fixed costs of patent 
litigation and the variable costs of losing, a duty to monitor excessive 
risk-taking relative to patent infringement becomes ever more 
important. This section will demonstrate that this duty not only likely 
exists, but there is good reason to lobby for its greater acknowledgment 
and effectiveness.  
1. Patent Risk Management in Practice 
Risk management related to patent infringement is complex. 
Patent rights are probabilistic in nature, and every measurement of the 
risk associated with the proximity of a company’s footprint—its 
products or services—to problematic patents is comprised of 
estimating and weighting multiple probabilities. Colleen Chien has 
provided a summary of the intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics that 
should be examined, as well as the correlation of some of those 
characteristics with patents that are actually litigated.113 She notes that 
“it leaves for future exploration the development of higher-resolution 
predictive models.”114 These models would presumably help patent 
risk-takers determine probabilities associated with these characteristics 
needed to make an informed risk management decision including, 
without exhaustion, (1) the probability that all problematic patents have 
been found; (2) the probability that the company’s footprint infringes 
an identified problematic patent, (3) the probability that the 
 112. Robert Sterne & Trevor Chaplick, Why Directors Must Take Responsibility for 
Intellectual Property, IAM MAG., Feb.–Mar. 2005, at 16.  
 113. See Chien, supra note 12, at 328–29 (noting that “it leaves for future exploration the 
development of higher-resolution predictive models.”). 
 114. Id. 
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problematic patent is valid, (4) the probability that the owner of the 
problematic patent would or is able to enforce the patent, (5) the 
probability that a license would be offered at a reasonable price relative 
to expected fixed plus variable litigation costs, and (6) the probability 
that designing around the problematic patent would cost more than a 
license or expected fixed plus variable litigation costs.115 The equation 
is not scientific, yet the resources and information now available to 
patentees allow each of these probabilities to be reasonably 
approximated, at least to the extent that an action can be determined, 
ex-ante, to be “excessive risk taking” vs. “reasonable risk taking.”116 
As Colleen Chien has expressed, “the uncertainty about which patents 
are going to be asserted can be reduced through identification of the 
riskiest patents ahead of time,” and litigation risk may be assessed by 
examining intrinsic and acquired characteristics which help a risk-taker 
understand “the economic value of the patent, the characteristics of the 
owner of the patent, and her propensity to litigate.”117  
Many companies exercise diligent and sophisticated patent risk 
procedures.118 Yet, there is little published evidence that patent risk 
management decisions made by the company, based on the 
probabilities identified above, are routinely made ex-ante a problem 
arising or, if they are, that the decisions are part of a systematic 
oversight procedure put in place or monitored by the board of 
directors.119 Deference should undoubtedly be given to the experts on 
legal matters in the legal division of a corporation with respect to 
assessing problematic patents identified in a freedom to operate search. 
 115. Id. Chien’s article demonstrates that patent risk management may be reasonably 
manageable, and that more than just intrinsic qualities of a patent must be examined, including 
acquired characteristics such as recorded transfers, collateralizations, re-examinations, and 
change in size of patentee. However, she points out that, notwithstanding the ability to assess the 
risk presented by any one patent, the ability to actually find all relevant patents or “the real party 
in interest” is frustrated by patent office inefficiencies. See, e.g., id. at 327–28. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Hearing on Abusive Patent Litigation: H.R. 845, supra note 18 (evidencing the 
procedures that companies like Cisco, Johnson & Johnson, Adobe, and JC Penny take to evaluate 
patent risk). 
 119. Id. (There are 264 pages of testimony from senior counsel at numerous companies 
explaining the risk that patent assertion presents to their companies, detailing how that risk is 
presented to the company, the actions the companies must take and the impact those actions have, 
but there is no mention that those actions, or the ex-ante decisions the companies made which 
may have given rise to the risk, or the systems in place to address those risks, were ever brought 
to or reviewed by the board of the companies.).  
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However, to the extent the assessment of such a patent results in a set 
of probabilities, the decision to take on risk in light of the probabilities 
should be subject to systematic oversight. To the extent that the 
decision could result in “bet-the-company” litigation or involve 
potential damages liabilities that would affect shareholder value, it 
seems reasonable that the systematic oversight required would involve 
information reporting lines reaching a very high level, or even the 
board. 
Many other companies, as expert commentators have pointed out, 
may be motivated to ignore problematic patents, and in fact do in order 
to avoid having knowledge of infringed patents.120 Despite the merits 
of avoiding knowledge in light of willful infringement risk, this 
decision in and of itself increases the likelihood of lawsuit, and to the 
extent the risk in any given case would be large enough to affect 
shareholder value, it seems reasonable that there should be additional 
oversight of these practices.  
2. Defining the Duty 
Caremark and Stone are clear: monitoring and oversight are key 
to the good-faith obligation of boards of directors as corporate 
fiduciaries. Also clear is the fact that not all activities of corporate 
employees can or should be monitored. Thus, in the oversight context, 
it is important to discern the board’s obligation "with respect to the 
organization and monitoring of the enterprise to assure that the 
corporation functions within the law to achieve its purposes."121 After 
Stone, as it relates to illegal conduct, we know the obligation requires 
directors to (1) establish monitoring systems and (2) pay appropriate 
attention to relevant information, whether internal or external, to ensure 
that they are able to spot "red flags."122 A single dramatic incident 
pointing to a flaw in a monitoring system may give rise to a red flag, as 
 120. See Chien, supra note 12, at 286 (“Successful searching carries a penalty—the risk of 
treble damages. As a result, many companies do not even try to identify the patents that their 
products may tread upon, remaining ignorant of the risks they run until it is too late.”); see also 
ROBERT STERNE & DAVID CORNWELL, WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS A BARRIER TO 
DISSEMINATION OF PATENT INFORMATION, SEDONA CONF. ON PATENT LITIGATION 3 (2002) 
(“Many products or services could be covered by claims of a multitude of unexpired patents. Thus, 
many normal competitors do not perform a freedom to operate investigation to try to determine if 
there are patent infringement problems; their cost/benefit analysis militates against such an 
investigation.”). 
 121. Stone, 911 A.2d at 372–73. 
 122. Id. at 368. 
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can a series of events over a period of time sufficient to raise them to 
the board's attention.123 It follows that liability stems from either (i) 
“utterly fail[ing] to implement any reporting or information system or 
controls” or (ii) “having implemented such system or controls, 
consciously fail[ing] to monitor or oversee its operations.”124 In 
addition, a scienter element is required, such that a plaintiff must plead 
“particularized facts . . . that [the directors] had ‘actual or constructive 
knowledge’ that their conduct was legally improper.”125  
Therefore, if a duty to monitor patent risk exists, a set of facts 
fitting within the following hypothetical would presumably give rise to 
a Caremark claim: a corporation (a)(i) systematically neglects to 
conduct any or adequate search for problematic patents before creating 
a footprint,126 or (a)(ii) conducts such freedom-to-operate searches but 
does not have a system in place for monitoring or ensuring proper 
oversight of the risk-taking decisions made relative to the risk 
probabilities discovered through the search or any notices of 
infringement received,127 and (b) its board knows or should have 
known that (i) the corporation operates in a litigious patent space, (ii) 
the corporation does not own every patent that would be needed to 
cover its footprint, (iii) the corporation or the corporation’s competitors 
have been the target of demand letters, (iv) the corporation’s 
competitors have purchased or sold patents that are identified to be 
problematic patents, and/or (v) the validity of the corporation’s patents 
covering its footprint have been challenged by a competitor.128 
Additional hypothetical scenarios could also give rise to a claim, for 
example, replacing (a)(i) or (a)(ii) with “whose board decides to 
knowingly infringe” or “whose board, having knowledge of an 
employee decision to knowingly infringe, neglects to become properly 
informed of the risks.”129 
 123. See Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 733 
(2007). 
 124. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (emphasis added). 
 125. See Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 240 (Del. 2009); see also Stone, 
911 A.2d at 370 (“[I]mposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they 
were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.”). 
 126. See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 127. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 128. See Lyondell Chemical Co., 970 A.2d at 240; see also In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
 129. See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967–72. 
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3. Recognizing the Duty 
Support for recognizing a duty to monitor patent risk can be found 
in case law, policy, and logic.  
Case Law. Caremark tells us that the oversight duty covers 
employee or corporate conduct in violation of law or regulations. Patent 
infringement is conduct prohibited by federal statute, namely, 35 
U.S.C. §271. Patent infringement is not criminal conduct, and a claim 
for patent infringement is brought in a civil suit.130 It does not carry 
criminal penalties. Instead, it is a prohibited act in violation of the 
exclusive rights of a patentee, granting right of the patentee to bring 
action for damages or injunction.131 Copyright infringement, on the 
other hand, may be a criminal act with imposable statutory fines.132 
Notably, copyright infringement requires actual copying—or a 
volitional act demonstrating culpability133—while patent infringement 
is a strict liability offense requiring no intent, knowledge or even 
access. Nevertheless, there is no language in Caremark and its line of 
cases that expressly restricts the duty to monitor to criminal conduct. 
Moreover, all of the rhetoric, in these cases and from commentators 
since, has been “wrongdoing”, “illegal” conduct, or “compliance with 
the law.”134 “Illegal” conduct covers all acts forbidden by law, 
especially but not exclusively criminal acts.135 Chancellor Allen 
provided in Caremark that the purpose of the system and information 
reporting that a board is required to put in place is so that the board may 
 130. But see Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (the 
Supreme Court imported a criminal concept of intent—willful blindness—into the statute for 
patent infringement). 
 131. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2013). 
 132. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2013); see also MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
§15.01[A][2]; see also United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. Neb. 1991) (holding 
that willful infringement means a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty”) 
(quoting Cheek v. United States, 298 U.S. 192, 200 (1991)). 
 133. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 
1369–70 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Culpability may simply be proven by “access.” See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 9.1.1 (3d ed. 2011); NIMMER, supra note 132, at § 13.01[B]. 
 134. See Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra note 91, at 1784 (“Our third 
category within the overall umbrella of good faith is ‘conduct involving illegality,’ a ‘culpable’ 
lack of diligence to prevent illegal acts, such as was alleged in Stone itself and in Caremark, or 
actual commission of illegal acts, the most notable example of which is perhaps Miller v. 
AT&T.”); see Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d at 130 (using “employee wrongdoing”). 
 135. See OXFORD DICTIONARY, available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/defini 
tion/american_english/illegal (“Contrary to or forbidden by law, especially criminal law.”). 
 
V31_MCCLURE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2015 3:53 PM 
2015]  ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PATENT MARKET 243 
“reach informed judgments concerning [] the corporation's compliance 
with law.”136  
There is a stark difference between illegal conduct and excessive 
risk-taking. Christine Hurt’s argument that the duty to monitor should 
not extend to financial risk taking because, after all, “[m]ost of the 
behavior at the heart of the financial crisis was not obviously 
intentional violations of criminal laws or other regulations,” does not 
impact the duty’s application to patent infringement. It seems clear that 
patent infringement falls squarely within the conduct that gives rise to 
a duty to monitor. There is risk in patents, however, that are not actually 
litigated and found to be infringing. In many cases, the costs or losses 
associated with patent infringement do not actually result from a 
finding of patent infringement, but from settlement as a result of 
alleged patent infringement.137 For the purposes of this article, the two 
will be treated the same, acknowledging that patent risk arises because 
of the potential illegality of action, and the duty to manage the risk 
includes preventing conduct that could be illegal just the same as 
conduct that is illegal. 
Policy. As has already been discussed, Hill and McDonnell (2007) 
proffer that “the most intelligible construction of [the rationale 
supporting the board’s duties regarding illegal conduct] includes harm 
to shareholders and harm to society.”138 Specifically, “[s]hareholders 
are also citizens, and insofar as laws advance the general social welfare, 
citizens care about that. A diversified shareholder with small stakes in 
any one corporation may well find that the public interest predominates 
over the corporate interest.”139 In the patent context, unknown 
infringement by competitors could be assumed to directly harm the 
financial profile of the corporation that owns the infringed patent, as 
any market share or other exclusive benefit that could be held by the 
 136. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 170. 
 137. See Chien, supra note 12, at 324 (Chien used data from litigated patents to support her 
model demonstrating that acquired characteristics are obtainable and correlate positively with 
patent risk, however, she notes that the entire picture of patent risk is not painted solely by what 
is actually litigated. “[L]itigated patents represent a subset of two other groupings of patents with 
relevance to patent risk: potentially infringed patents and potentially asserted patents. Of these 
two groups, potentially infringed patents are of less concern from a defensive perspective because 
of the pervasive non-enforcement that others have described. However, potentially-asserted, yet 
unlitigated, patents represent potentially costly threats to companies, albeit ones that avoid the 
expense and disruption associated with litigation.”). 
 138. Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra note 91, at 1784–85. 
 139. Id. 
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patent owner is diluted or eliminated.140 The infringer, however, 
assumes the risk of patent infringement that could negatively affect its 
financial profile.141 As evidence, Bessen and Meurer have 
demonstrated that a patent litigation-filing announcement has a 
negative effect on defendant firms, after controlling certain factors 
pertaining to firm characteristics.142 Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles showed 
that, while a successful patent litigation can have a positive wealth 
effect for a plaintiff, it is generally not as significant as the negative 
wealth effect for the loser.143 Exemplifying this net negative wealth 
effect, the announcement that Samsung lost its patent litigation against 
Apple and was ordered to pay $2 billion in damages resulted in a 
decrease of its stock price by 5%, while Apple’s stock price increased 
by 2%.144 Therefore, assuming diversified shareholders, a culture of 
rampant infringement and patent litigation could mean a detriment to 
investments that exceeds any benefit to investments.145 Factoring in the 
dead weight fixed costs spent by both sides in patent litigation, the net 
position of a diversified shareholder could be negatively affected in a 
culture where excessive patent risk is not monitored and prevented. 
 140. One alternative view, however, is that a market for a technology is made larger by 
additional market participants, and despite widespread infringement of a patent holder’s patent on 
the technology the patent holder benefits from participating in a larger market with increased 
adoption of the invention. This is the theory proffered by Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk, when offering 
Tesla’s patents to competitors via “open source” licensing. See Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are 
Belong To You, TESLA BLOG (June 12, 2014), http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent 
-are-belong-you.  
 141. After a federal jury in Pittsburgh ordered Marvell Technology Group to pay a $1.17 
billion award for infringing Carnegie Mellon patents covering integrated circuits, Marvell’s stock 
price fell to a low of $6.98 per share at its lowest point resulting in an approximate market 
capitalization of around $3.4 billion dollars—half of what it is today. See Carnegie Mellon 
University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., No. 09-290, 2014 WL 1320154, at *15–16 (W.D. 
Pa. Mar. 31, 2014), available at http://www.cmu.edu/patent-lawsuit/images/timeline/march 
-2014-court-opinion.pdf.  
 142. James E. Bessen & Michael Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 J. OF L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 59 (2013). 
 143. Sanjai Bhagat, John Bizjak & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Shareholder Wealth Implications 
of Corporate Lawsuits, 27 FIN. MGMT. 5 (1998). 
 144. Sanjun & Changi, supra note 17, at 4.  
 145. Michael Orey & Moira Herbst, Inside Nathan Myhrvold’s Mysterious New Idea 
Machine, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 2, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories 
/2006-07-02/inside-nathan-myhrvolds-mysterious-new-idea-machine (Nathan Myhrvold, former 
executive at Microsoft, stating that “there has long been a culture of intentionally infringing 
patents or turning a blind eye to potential infringement,” and accounting that when he was at 
Microsoft this was part of the accepted business culture in the software industry.). 
 
V31_MCCLURE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2015 3:53 PM 
2015]  ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PATENT MARKET 245 
Likewise, shareholders and society have an interest in furthering 
innovation to create new products and services. For shareholders, 
innovation provides new value to current investments and new 
investment opportunities. For society, innovation provides new utility 
and efficiencies that increase a standard of living. One of many 
objectives of the patent system is to ensure more useful inventions, and 
indeed the U.S. Constitution provides for the creation of intellectual 
property rights “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts.”146 Because a patent discloses the invention publicly, it enables 
others to learn from and build upon the invention and, at the same time, 
directs them away from research that might wastefully duplicate the 
work of the patent holder.147 Patent infringement, then, thwarts this 
objective and therefore the benefit of the patent system to shareholders 
and society in general. Moreover, as Bressen and Meurer (2013) have 
offered, the private costs of patent litigation result in a disincentive to 
investing in innovation, and as a result, the risk of infringement acts 
like a “tax” on innovation.148 
In the same vein, the practice of ignoring patents in light of risking 
willful infringement also works against the patent system objective of 
disseminating information about inventions to promote innovation. 
Robert Sterne and David Cornwell (2002) identified this dichotomy in 
the willful infringement doctrine, writing the below, albeit prior to the 
doctrine changing a bit in In re Seagate149 in 2007: 
 146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added); see also Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. 
Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 1031 
(1998). 
 147. Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 
20 J. OF L. AND ECON. 265 (1977). 
 148. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 142.  
 149. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (the Federal Circuit overruled the prior “due care” 
standard for willful infringement, replacing it with a recklessness standard. To prove willfulness 
under this new standard, a patentee must first show by clear and convincing evidence that an 
accused infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted 
infringement of a valid patent. A “totality of the circumstances” analysis applies, and the accused 
infringer’s “state of mind” is not relevant to the inquiry. In applying In re Seagate, some courts 
have treated actual notice as a prerequisite to an assertion of willful infringement. Some courts 
have even required notice of an infringement claim—not just notice of another’s patent rights—
as a prerequisite to willful infringement. Even if actual notice is considered a prerequisite to a 
finding of willful infringement, however, Seagate does not appear to have affected the fairly low 
bar for what constitutes actual notice); see Jason Finch, Willfulness Allegations Post-Seagate—
The Role of Actual Notice, BAKER BOTTS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, available at 
http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/2010NovemberIPReportWillfulnessAllegationsPostSea
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The quid pro quo of granting the inventor a time-limited exclusive 
right is the adequate disclosure in the patent of information about 
the protected invention to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art 
to make and use the invention. By examining the patent literature, 
the public can benefit from the information transferred by the 
inventor, and build on this body of knowledge. By hoisting itself on 
the advances of others, a new inventor can emerge to make further 
advances . . . Unfortunately, willful patent infringement effectively 
prevents this centralized body of information from being examined 
by the people most interested in it, competitors of the patent 
owner . . . The laudable goal of protecting the patent owner from 
infringement by an unscrupulous competitor is turned on its head in 
these contexts because the normal competitor cannot risk obtaining 
knowledge of the unasserted patents of the patent owner.150 
It follows that there is a public interest in a duty to monitor patent 
risk, including implementing and paying due attention to a system that 
adequately searches for, assesses, and makes informed decisions 
regarding risk-taking relative to problematic patents. Such a system 
will not only help avoid patent risk, but should help guarantee the 
intended use of published patent information to prevent infringement 
and further innovation. 
Logic. The frequency with which patent litigation is being filed 
and the risk that patent litigation may present to shareholder-value 
should be sufficient to pay careful attention. Because the fixed costs of 
patent litigation remain constant without regard to the size of the 
company paying them, it is an event that could be devastating to cash 
flow for small companies. To gain a sense for who that covers, 96.7% 
of all employer companies in the U.S. have less than $10 million in 
annual revenues. In view of the fact that average fixed costs of patent 
litigation, when at least $1 million is at risk, is $2.5 million, defending 
gate.htm (last visited March 16, 2014); see also Anascape, Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 9:06-CV-
158, 2008 WL 7182476, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2008) (“‘To willfully infringe a patent, the 
patent must exist and one must have knowledge of it.’”) (citing State Industries Inc. v. A.O. Smith 
Corp., 751 F.2d 1126, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also Jardin v. Datallegro, Inc., No. 08cv1462-
IEG-RBB, 2009 WL 186194, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009) (holding that Seagate did not change 
the pleading requirements for willful infringement and that the plaintiff need only plead the 
equivalent of ‘[the accused infringer acted] with knowledge of the patent and his infringement’ to 
meet the requirements of Rule 8) (quoting Sentry Prot. Prods. Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 
910, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also Creative Internet Advertising Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 
6:07cv354, 2009 WL 2382132, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 30, 2009) (stating that an accused infringer 
must be on notice of an infringement claim to have willfully infringed). 
 150. See STERNE & CORNWELL, supra note 120, at 3–4. 
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patent litigation could require at least 25% of the annual revenues of 
more than 96% of the companies in this country.151 Exacerbating the 
risk, empirical data shows that patent trolls target companies in this 
category quite often.152 It is unlikely that many of these companies 
implement a patent risk management system necessary to minimize this 
risk, much less satisfy a duty to monitor illegal patent infringement.153 
Empirical data shows that patent infringement is an event that 
negatively impacts shareholder value, as markets do react to the 
outcome of patent litigation events.154 Notwithstanding the potential 
outcomes of unsuccessful patent litigation, including damages and 
injunction, a firm could lose additional value in market reaction. With 
three decisions in 2013 that exceeded a billion dollars, and a median 
damages award between 2007 and 2012 of $4.9 million,155 the risk is 
such that a system for monitoring actions that could give rise to that 
risk seems logical. 
As has been mentioned, some commentators have made a case 
against extending the duty to monitor financial risk. One argument was 
that that recognizing a duty to monitor financial risk would be 
imprudent because a breach of the duty would be identifiable only in 
 151. See Statistics about Business Size, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
https://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html#RcptSize (last visited March 11, 2014) (96.7% of 
employer firms make $10 million or less in annual receipts). 
 152. See Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, Santa Clara Law Digital Commons 
(Sept. 13, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146251 
(finding that small and midsize companies with less than $1 billion in revenues now constitute 
90% of the unique defendants in patent troll suits; Firms with less than $100 million in revenue 
represent 66% of the defendants; Firms with less than $10 million make up 55% of the 
defendants). 
 153. While patent risk management may be manageable, it is expensive and resource 
consuming. Depending on the technical complexity of the product and the saturation of the 
relevant patent landscape, a complete review of the patent landscape can require hundreds of hours 
of review. If done using outside counsel, this can be multiplied by a conservative estimate of 
$250/hour, potentially totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
 154. See Alan Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE. J.L. & TECH. 103 
(2013) (finding that the correlation of the outcome of patent litigation events with stock market 
reaction is “statistically meaningful”); see also Paula Schliessler, The Effect of Patent Litigation 
on Firm Performance—Evidence for Germany, Centre for European Economic Research (Jan. 
2013), available at http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13015.pdf (finding evidence that 
“defendants are negatively affected by a loss in trial or a settlement deal, while a victory leaves 
their rating unchanged. I further show that small and inexperienced defendants are at a 
disadvantage compared to larger and more experienced firms, indicating that they are affected 
more severely by business disruption and financial distress.”). 
 155. PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5; see also Seaman, supra note 10. 
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hindsight.156 Unlike financial risk, patent risk is measureable against a 
bright line rule: patent infringement is statutorily illicit. In financial 
risk, only a bad outcome is measurable, and without a defined act that 
is measurable against a law or regulation, a bad outcome requires 
discovering breach only after the excessive risk-taking is complete. 
This should not follow to the patent risk context because, as has been 
highlighted herein, patent risk management is reasonably manageable, 
and resources now available make problematic patents increasingly 
identifiable and assessable allowing a company to determine an 
appropriate action.  
A next argument is that the duty to manage financial risk would 
also encompass failures to take risks, making risk-averse firms also 
susceptible to breach of duty claims.157 As has been described in this 
section, this logic would not follow to patent risk because a failure to 
take a risk relative to patent infringement means avoiding illegal 
conduct and furthering innovation by intentionally designing around 
and creating something new. A firm that does not infringe patents 
would not be susceptible to breach of a fiduciary duty for intentionally 
avoiding illegal conduct.  
Another argument for not extending the duty to financial risk is 
that a Caremark claim may only be successful if a board does not have 
a reporting or risk-management system in place, and “[a] modern U.S. 
publicly-held corporation that faces any type of financial risk will 
almost certainly have a system in place.”158 As was demonstrated 
herein, this author believes that the systems required to satisfy a duty 
to monitor patent risk likely to not exist in many companies, and 
particularly not in 96.7% of the smaller U.S. firms that may be most 
vulnerable to the severity of patent risk consequences. Moreover, 
current willful-infringement doctrine may motivate some firms to 
ignore patents, and this activity, if intentionally occurring without 
appropriate oversight, demonstrates non-existence of an adequate 
system in light of the duty.  
Finally, it has been argued that a duty to manage financial risk 
implies that a court is able to determine the optimal amount of risk, or 
at least what is too much or too little risk, and that this would be 
impossible for financial risks. Because of the bright line rule of illegal 
conduct vs. legal conduct in the patent context, the optimal amount of 
risk should be easily ascertainable—an amount which does not infringe 
 156. See HURT, supra note 47, at 7–8. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 39–40. 
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a valid patent. Given that this determination must be made using 
probabilities, and not absolutes, the “too much risk” standard should be 
one of reasonableness in light of the information known or available. 
In summary, the costs and consequences of “too much patent 
risk,” or patent infringement, show that a duty to monitor patent risk is 
logical. Moreover, the logic behind not extending a duty to monitor 
financial risk is not workable in the patent risk management context. 
4. Satisfying the Duty 
 To satisfy its duty to monitor patent risk, a board should (1) 
establish a monitoring system which identifies, appropriately assesses 
and reports information about patent risk to the level of accountability 
corresponding to that risk; and (2) pay appropriate attention to relevant 
information, whether internal or external, to ensure that it is able to spot 
"red flags" demonstrating patent risk or excessive risk-taking related to 
that risk.159 Caremark and its progeny of cases tell us that “red flags” 
are important to finding a breach of the duty to monitor. In the patent 
context, red flags are difficult to avoid, or ever present, in certain 
industries. The consistent “red flag” in industries like 
telecommunications where products are covered by hundreds or even 
thousands of patents is, quite frankly, that infringement is known, 
rampant, and potentially unavoidable.160 Under one view, this 
circumstance is so obvious and critical that ignorance of it and failure 
to implement a monitoring system could reasonably be deemed to 
satisfy the scienter element required by courts. External “red flags” like 
this knowledge should at least be imputed to the board in such 
industries, requiring additional focus on the monitoring system in 
place. The most apparent internal “red flag” is the receipt of demand 
letters, demonstrating that competitors or other patent holders believe 
its patents are being infringed by the company. 
 159. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 368. 
 160. See Orey & Herbst, supra note 145; see also David Streitfeld, E-Commerce Battles 
‘Me’-CommerceLP has VROS, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003 (“If you’re selling online, at the most 
recent count there are 4,319 patents you could be violating,” said David E. Martin, chief executive 
of M-Cam Inc., an Arlington, Va.-based risk-management firm specializing in patents. “If you 
also planned to advertise, receive payments for or plan shipments of your goods, you would need 
to be concerned about approximately 11,000.”); see also Charles Arthur, Apple Using “Bogus” 
Patents To Make Android More Expensive, Says Google, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2011), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/aug/04/apple-patents-android-expensive-google 
(Google CEO, David Drummond, stating that a smartphone might involve more than 250,000 
patent claims). 
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As was the case in Caremark and Stone, a finding of breach of the 
duty to monitor patent risk will be very difficult as long as a board 
ensures a monitoring system is in place and is paid due attention. In 
addition, an element of scienter will be required, meaning the board 
knew or should have known its conduct was not in compliance with the 
law, or it acted in conscious disregard of its duty to act.161 Knowledge 
that a company’s products infringe a third party patent, then, followed 
by inaction would likely satisfy the bad faith requirement. As a result, 
such knowledge should be followed by stopping any infringing activity 
or seeking a license from the patent owner.  
CONCLUSION 
Added accountability for patent infringement helps to avoid the 
damaging position that many companies take—ignorance of the issue 
until a problem arises.162 It also helps to support the clear intent of the 
patent system—to disseminate knowledge and help innovators build 
upon the ideas before them. The less companies infringe third party 
patents, the less time and resources are spent on litigation and the more 
is spent on building more, new useful products. There is support in case 
law, policy, and logic for acknowledging a board of director duty to 
monitor patent risk. This level of accountability is appropriate, as it is 
commensurate with the level of the risk that poses harm to shareholders 
and, in aggregate, to society. The duty should be satisfied by 
implementing a system that effectively minimizes patent risk by 
identifying, assessing, communicating and taking on appropriate risk 
relative to problematic patents. 
 
 161. See Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 240. 
 162. See STERNE & CORNWELL, supra note 120, at 3 (“The thinking of many normal 
competitors is that it is much more cost effective to deal with a patent infringement problem once 
it surfaces than to unilaterally try to figure out possible problems ahead of time that may never 
materialize.”). 
 
